Who’s Swallowing the “Bitter Pill”?:
Reforming Write-Offs in the State of Washington
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I. INTRODUCTION
Washington’s application of the collateral source rule permits recovery for medical expenses that were never incurred and have no relationship to their market value. This application is set forth in Hayes v.
Wieber Enterprises, Inc., where the plaintiff sued a restaurant for injuries
she sustained from falling down the restaurant’s basement stairs.1 At trial, the plaintiff introduced evidence that her physician billed $5,800 for
medical services even though he had accepted $3,300 from her health
insurer as payment in full.2 The trial court refused to admit evidence that
her physician had accepted $3,300 as payment in full because the $3,300
was from a collateral source.3 Accordingly, the plaintiff was allowed to
recover the $1,500 “written off” by her physician.
The court of appeals affirmed, holding the trial court did not abuse
its discretion when it refused to admit evidence the physician had accepted $3,300 as payment in full.4 The court, however, did not address
whether evidence the physician had accepted the $3,300 as payment in
full was barred by the collateral source rule.5 Instead, the court relied on
the physician’s testimony that his $5,800 bill was reasonable and that the
defendant did not present testimony the bill was unreasonable.6 The appellate court, therefore, having decided the case on an evidentiary issue,
did not disturb the trial court’s application of the collateral source rule.
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2. Id. at 498.
3. Id.
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The collateral source rule is set forth in the Restatement Second of
Torts: “Payments made to or benefits conferred on the injured party from
other sources are not credited against the tortfeasor’s liability, although
they cover all or a part of the harm for which the tortfeasor is liable.”7
The collateral source rule is also set forth in the Washington Practice
Series (WAPRAC) § 6.35: “Under the collateral source rule, a tortfeasor
may not reduce damages, otherwise recoverable, to reflect payments received by a plaintiff from a collateral source. A collateral source is a
source independent of one of the tortfeasors.”8 WAPRAC notes the majority of cases applying the collateral source rule in Washington are cases
in which the collateral payment consisted of Medicare benefits; social
security and veterans’ pension benefits; disability pension benefits;
workers’ compensation benefits; unemployment compensation benefits;
or where a plaintiff received payments from his insurer covered all or
part of the loss.9
The reasoning behind the collateral source rule is to ensure justice
and deterrence. When a tortfeasor is not obliged to correct the wrong she
caused, then the victim never receives what is due from the tortfeasor—
justice. The collateral source rule, therefore, ensures that a tortfeasor fully pays for the damages he commits. The collateral source rule is also
necessary to preserve the deterrence function of tort law by not allowing
a tortfeasor to avoid liability because a plaintiff had the foresight to purchase insurance. Whether because of justice or deterrence, at common
law the collateral source rule makes certain that a jury will not reduce a
plaintiff’s award because he received compensation from a third party.
Why should the collateral source rule compel the defendant in
Hayes to pay the original amount billed, $5,800, when the physician accepted $3,300 as payment in full? Is not $3,300 the reasonable or market
value of the medical services provided to the plaintiff? This Comment
discusses whether Washington should amend its application of the collateral source rule to disallow the recovery of write-offs and whether the
amount accepted as payment in full by a medical provider is the reasonable or market value of the services provided. Part II of this Comment
explores the collateral source rule and the development of the “reasonable and necessary” requirement in Washington. Part III discusses the impact of the California Supreme Court’s recent decision in Howell v.
Hamilton Meats & Provisions, Inc. and its progeny.10 Part IV explores
the resurgence of tort reform throughout the country while providing an
7. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 920A(2).
8. 16 WASH. PRAC., TORT LAW AND PRACTICE § 6:35 (3d ed).
9. Id.
10. Howell v. Hamilton Meats & Provisions, Inc., 257 P.3d 1130 (Cal. 2011).
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assessment of other state court rulings on write-offs including the issues
of subrogation and contractual agreements. Part V concludes with why
Washington should revisit the issues raised in Hayes v. Wieber Enterprises, Inc. and no longer permit the amount written off to be inadmissible under the collateral source rule.
II. THE COLLATERAL SOURCE RULE AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF
“REASONABLE AND NECESSARY” IN WASHINGTON
A 1913 civil suit involving injuries sustained by a police officer is
the earliest Washington State case that discusses the collateral source
rule.11 In Heath v. Seattle Taxicab Co., the plaintiff police officer witnessed a cab driving south on Fremont Avenue at a high speed.12 When
the cab was within about seventy-five feet of him, the officer stepped in
the street on Fremont Avenue and signaled to the cab to stop, intending
to arrest the driver.13 Instead of stopping, the driver of the cab increased
its speed, hitting the plaintiff.14 The evidence showed that the police officer suffered a partial dislocation of the right shoulder, an injury to the
right knee, and that his back was severely bruised.15
Prior to the accident, the police officer had contributed 1.5% of his
monthly income to the police pension fund provided by the Police Pension Act.16 The taxicab company argued that the trial court erred by refusing to give the following instruction:
[I]f you believe from the evidence that the plaintiff was reimbursed
from his lost wages out of the police pension fund of the city of Seattle and was reimbursed, wholly or in part, for his hospital and
medical bills, then the plaintiff is not entitled to recover the sums
for which he has been reimbursed out of said fund, and you shall allow plaintiff only such sums as he actually lost by reason of loss of
time and wages and hospital and medical services.17

The Washington State Supreme Court held there was no error in this refusal.18
The Heath court explained that the pension fund was no different in
principle from ordinary accident insurance where a person is reimbursed

11. Heath v. Seattle Taxicab Co., 131 P. 843 (Wash. 1913).
12. Id. at 844.
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. Id. at 847.
16. Id. at 846.
17. Id.
18. Id. at 187.
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by an insurance company.19 A person reimbursed by an insurance company for his loss of time and expenses caused by his injury is not precluded from maintaining an action for those same items against the person who caused the injury.20 The court stated that it would be
contrary to public policy and shocking to the sense of justice to hold
that the proceeds of insurance paid for by the injured person for his
benefit . . . should inure to the benefit of and grant immunity to the
person whose negligence, willful or otherwise, injured him or
caused his death.21

This rule was reaffirmed in Engstrom v. City of Seattle, where city
employee Mr. Oscar Engstrom was injured while working on the streets
and sewer system.22 His injury was caused by the negligence of the Puget
Sound Electric Railway Company.23 Due to his injury, Mr. Engstrom was
incapacitated for a period of thirteen months and subsequently recovered
$4,000 from the railway company on the account of his injuries and for
loss of time.24 However, article 16, § 32 of the Seattle City Charter contained a provision that stated, “Any person in the service of the city under civil service appointment who shall be disabled in the discharge of
his duties, shall receive full pay during such disability not to exceed thirty days, and half pay not to exceed six months . . . .”25 Mr. Engstrom
consequently brought an action against the city to recover the $288 due
from the charter provision.26 The Washington State Supreme Court reversed the lower court’s opinion relying on the arguments set forth in
Heath.27 The court held that even though Mr. Engstrom collected damages from the railway company, it did not relieve the city from reimbursing
Mr. Engstrom for his injuries or complying with its employment contract.28
The collateral source rule was also applied in Stone v. City of Seattle, where the plaintiff was injured when he fell into a hole on a public
sidewalk in front of an apartment building.29 The plaintiff brought an
action against the city and the owner of the apartment complex for negli-

19. Id. at 186.
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. Engstrom v. City of Seattle, 159 P. 816 (Wash. 1916).
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. Id. at 817.
28. Id.
29. Stone v. City of Seattle, 391 P.2d 179, 180 (Wash. 1964).
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gently failing to maintain the sidewalk.30 The trial court’s instructions to
the jury mentioned that the plaintiff was collecting social security benefits at the time of the accident, and on review, the Washington State Supreme Court stated,
It is well established that the fact a plaintiff receives, from a collateral source, payments of this nature which have a tendency to mitigate the consequences of the injury that he otherwise would have
suffered, may not be taken into consideration when assessing the
damages that the defendant must pay.31

The Washington State Supreme Court reversed because of the trial
court’s error with the jury instructions, stating that the social security
benefits should have had no bearing on the jury deliberation.32
In Ciminksi v. SCI Corp., the plaintiff fell in the defendant’s restaurant and sustained severe hip injuries.33 The jury returned a verdict of
$79,000, which included $14,000 paid by Medicare under the plaintiff’s
Part A coverage.34 The defendant moved to reduce the verdict by the
amount paid by Medicare, but the trial court denied the motion on the
grounds that the payments were from a collateral source.35 The defendant
appealed the denial and the Washington State Supreme Court granted
review.36 The appellant argued that the collateral source rule applies only
to benefits that the plaintiff “has previously extended consideration,”
such as health insurance.37 The appellant contended that because the respondent’s wages were not taxed to finance Medicare, she did not pay
for the Part A coverage, but the appellant was compelled to pay taxes for
Medicare and thus should not have to pay twice.38 The Washington State
Supreme Court did not agree and held that the “application of the collateral source rule need not be conditioned on some payment by the plaintiff for the benefit received. To so limit the doctrine would be contrary to
the policy that the wrongdoer should not benefit from collateral payments made to the person he has wronged.”39
There are a few exceptions to the collateral source rule in Washington. First, the collateral source rule does not apply to sources of compen30. Id.
31. Id. at 183.
32. Id.
33. Ciminski v. SCI Corp., 585 P.2d 1182 (Wash. 1978).
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. Id. at 1183.
38. Id.
39. Id.
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sation that are not independent of the tortfeasor.40 In Maziarski v. Bair,
for example, the plaintiff was riding his bicycle when a car driven by the
defendant struck him.41 At the time of the accident, the defendant was
insured by the Hartford Insurance Company, and her policy provided
both liability coverage and Personal Injury Protection (PIP) coverage.42
The plaintiff incurred medical bills in the amount of $7,753, which Hartford fully paid under the PIP coverage before any determination of fault
had been made.43 The collateral source rule did not apply because the
payments at issue came from the defendant’s PIP coverage, which was a
fund she created and thus not a collateral source.44
Second, the collateral source rule does not apply if the compensation is for a different injury.45 In Wheeler v. Catholic Archdiocese of Seattle, the plaintiff started to have problems with her supervisor in April
1984.46 Then in May 1984, the plaintiff injured her hand while working
and took a three-month leave to recuperate.47 The plaintiff spent three
weeks of her three-month leave in an inpatient treatment facility after
attempting suicide because of her health and problems at work.48 The
plaintiff subsequently took additional leave for surgeries to repair her
hand.49 During these absences, the plaintiff received workers’ compensation benefits.50 After the plaintiff’s job was filled while she was on leave
for her second surgery, the plaintiff sued her employer for handicap discrimination, among other claims.51 In a pretrial ruling, the trial court
ruled the employer was not entitled to an offset of the plaintiff’s workers’
compensation benefits.52 The jury returned a general verdict of
$150,000.53 On appeal, the court of appeals held that the trial court erred
in refusing to offset the plaintiff’s damages award by the amount of her
workers’ compensation benefits representing replacement for lost wages.54 The Washington State Supreme Court affirmed because the collat-

40. Maziarski v. Bair, 924 P.2d 409 (Wash. Ct. App. 1996).
41. Id. at 410.
42. Id. at 411.
43. Id.
44. Id. at 413.
45. Wheeler v. Catholic Archdiocese of Seattle, 880 P.2d 29 (Wash. 1994).
46. Id. at 30.
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. Id. at 30–31.
52. Id. at 31.
53. Id.
54. Id.
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eral source rule had no application where the plaintiff was compensated
for two different injuries.55
While the collateral source rule precludes a defendant from introducing evidence that a plaintiff has already been compensated for her
injuries, a defendant is only liable for the reasonable value of the medical
services received by a plaintiff, even if the bills for the medical services
have been paid in full.56 A plaintiff’s burden to prove the reasonable value of medical services was set forth in Torgeson v. Hanford, where the
Washington State Supreme Court held that the trial court erred when it
submitted the plaintiff’s claims for medical services and hospital fees to
the jury without evidence of their reasonable value.57 The court stated,
One who is injured as the plaintiff claims to have been, if entitled to
recover against the party charged with the negligence which caused
the injury, is entitled to judgment for his expenses necessarily incurred in the treatment of the injuries sustained by him, but he cannot recover what he may agree to pay the physician for his services,
because the other party is not bound by such agreement. Under such
circumstances the injured party must prove what would be reasonable compensation to the physician for the services rendered, and
would be entitled to recover that amount if he had paid or was liable
to pay the same.58

A plaintiff’s burden to prove the reasonable value of medical services was affirmed in Patterson v. Horton, where the Washington Court
of Appeals concluded that the trial court erred in relying on medical bills
as proof of medical costs without requiring the plaintiff to show that the
bills were reasonable and that the treatment was necessary.59 The trial
court adopted the plaintiff’s argument that payment of the bills created a
presumption that they were reasonable and necessary.60 The court of appeals, however, ruled that medical records and bills are relevant to prove
past medical expenses only if supported by additional evidence that the
treatment and bills were both necessary and reasonable.61 The Washington Pattern Instructions further explain that plaintiffs in negligence cases
are permitted to recover the reasonable value of the medical services they
receive—not the total of all bills paid.62 The amount actually billed or
55. Id. at 32.
56. See Torgeson v. Hanford, 139 P. 648 (Wash. 1914); Patterson v. Horton, 929 P.2d 1125
(Wash. Ct. App. 1997).
57. Torgeson, 139 P. at 649.
58. Id. (quoting Wheeler v. Tyler S. E. R. Co., 43 S.W. 876, 877 (Tex. Sup. Ct. 1898)).
59. Patterson v. Horton, 929 P.2d 1125, 1127 (Wash. Ct. App. 1997).
60. Id. at 1130.
61. Id.
62. 6 WASH. PRAC., WASH. PATTERN JURY INSTR. CIV. WPI 30.07.01 (6th ed.).
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paid is not determinative; rather, the question is whether the sums requested for medical services are reasonable.63
The formation of the collateral source rule and the requirement that
medical bills must be reasonable and necessary culminated in Hayes v.
Wieber Enterprises, Inc. In Hayes, the plaintiff’s physician billed the
plaintiff approximately $5,800 for medical services64 and testified at trial
that the bill was reasonable.65 The plaintiff’s physician, however, had
accepted approximately $3,300 from the plaintiff’s health insurer as
payment in full.66 At trial, the defendant sought to question the plaintiff’s
physician on the difference between the amount he accepted as payment
for his services and the amount he billed for these same services.67 The
trial court concluded the difference was a collateral source and refused
the offered proof on the difference between the amount accepted and the
amount billed.68
On appeal, the defendant argued that the $3,300 was the appropriate
evidence of the market value of the medical care received by the plaintiff.69 The defendant also argued that the collateral source rule only applied to actual amounts paid on the plaintiff’s behalf.70 The court of appeals did not explicitly address the defendant’s arguments; instead, the
court focused on whether the amount requested by the plaintiff was reasonable: “Plaintiffs in negligence cases are permitted to recover the reasonable value of the medical services they receive, not the total of all
bills paid. And the amount actually billed or paid is not itself determinative. The question is whether the sums requested for medical services are
reasonable.”71
The court’s focus on reasonableness led to the crux of its opinion:
Wieber could have challenged the reasonableness of Ms. Hayes’
medical bills by presenting testimony that the charges were unreasonable. The fact that the doctor accepted the first party insurance
carrier’s limit for his services does not tend to prove his charge for
these services was unreasonable. Dr. Oakley testified the bill was
reasonable. Wieber presented no evidence to the contrary. The trial
judge did not abuse his discretion by refusing to admit evidence that

63. Id.
64. Hayes v. Wieber Enterprises, Inc., 20 P.3d 496, 498 (Wash. Ct. App. 2001).
65. Id. at 499.
66. Id. at 498.
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. Id. at 498–99.
71. Id. at 499.
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Ms. Hayes’ physician accepted what her insurance company paid,
as payment in full.72

The court’s decision, in short, rested on the defendant not calling an
expert witness to testify that the plaintiff’s physician’s bill was unreasonable. Given the plaintiff’s physician’s full bill was approximately $5,800
and he accepted approximately $3,300 from the plaintiff’s health insurer as payment in full—a difference of only $1,500—it should come as no
surprise that the defendant did not hire an expert witness to testify on this
issue. Nevertheless, the trial court ruled that the collateral source rule
disallowed testimony of the discrepancy between the amount the plaintiff’s physician billed and the amount he actually accepted as payment in
full.73 If the defendant had retained an expert witness to testify that the
$3,300 accepted from the plaintiff’s health insurer as payment in full was
the reasonable or market value of the services provided by the plaintiff’s
physician, is such testimony barred by the collateral source rule? The
California Supreme Court’s recent decision in Howell v. Hamilton Meats
& Provisions, Inc. provides a jurisprudential blueprint for how Washington could amend its application of the collateral source rule.
III. THE IMPACT OF HOWELL V. HAMILTON MEATS & PROVISIONS, INC.
In Howell, the plaintiff was seriously injured in an automobile accident negligently caused by a driver who was working for the defendant.74
At trial, the defendant conceded liability and the necessity of the plaintiff’s medical treatment, only contesting the amounts of the plaintiff’s
economic and noneconomic damages.75
The defendant moved to exclude evidence of medical bills that neither the plaintiff nor her health insurer, PacifiCare, had paid.76 The defendant’s motion was based on PacifiCare records, which indicated the
plaintiff’s medical bills had been adjusted downward pursuant to an
agreement between the medical providers and PacifiCare.77 The agreement also provided that the plaintiff could not be billed for the balance of
the original bills beyond agreed-upon patient co-payments.78 The trial
court denied the motion, ruling that the plaintiff could present her full

72. Id.
73. Id.
74. Howell v. Hamilton Meats & Provisions, Inc., 257 P.3d 1130 (Cal. 2011).
75. Id. at 1133.
76. Id.
77. Id. at 1133–34.
78. Id. at 1134.
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bills to the jury and any reduction to reflect payment of reduced amounts
in a post-trial motion.79
The plaintiff presented testimony that the total amount billed for her
medical care up to the time of trial was $189,978, and the jury returned a
verdict awarding the same amount as damages for the plaintiff’s past
medical expenses.80 The defendant then made a post-trial motion to reduce past medical damages, pursuant to Hanif v. Housing Authority of
Yolo County,81 seeking a reduction of $130,286—the amount assertedly
written off by the plaintiff’s medical care providers.82 The defendant’s
motion was supported by two declarations that stated the difference between the amount billed by the plaintiff’s medical providers and the
amount accepted by them as payment in full was written off pursuant to
an agreement between them and the plaintiff’s private healthcare insurer,
PacifiCare.83 Both declarations stated that the providers had not filed
liens for, and would not pursue collection of, the written-off amounts.84
In opposition, the plaintiff argued that the reduction of the medical
damages would violate the collateral source rule.85 The plaintiff supported her opposition with patient agreements she had signed agreeing to pay
“usual and customary charges” and any physician’s fee her insurance did
not pay.86 The trial court granted the defendant’s motion, reducing past
medical damages to reflect the amount medical providers accepted as
payment in full.87 The California Court of Appeals reversed the reduction
order, holding that it violated the collateral source rule.88 The California
Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the court of appeals, holding
that an injured person could not recover the amount of a medical provider’s bill when the provider accepted as full payment, pursuant to a preexisting contract with the injured person’s health insurer, an amount less
than the provider’s bill.89 The court ruled that the collateral source rule
had no bearing because the differential between the amount billed and
the amount accepted as full payment were not damages the plaintiff
would have otherwise collected from the defendant.90

79. Id.
80. Id.
81. Hanif v. Hous. Auth., 246 Cal. Rptr. 192 (Cal. Ct. App. 1988).
82. Howell, 257 P.3d at 1134.
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. Id. at 1133.
90. Id.
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The Howell court began its analysis with an earlier California appellate court case, Hanif v. Housing Authority.91 In Hanif, the state insurance program, Medi-Cal, allegedly paid less than the reasonable value of
the plaintiff’s medical treatment.92 The plaintiff’s medical providers then
wrote off the difference between what it billed and what it was paid by
Medi-Cal.93 While the trial court awarded the plaintiff the larger “reasonable value” amount, the appellate court held that the trial court overcompensated the plaintiff for his past medical expenses, and recovery should
have been limited to the amount Medi-Cal had actually paid on the plaintiff’s behalf.94
The Hanif court reasoned that reasonable value is a term of limitation, not aggrandizement.95 The Hanif court also found that the only “detriment” or pecuniary “loss” suffered by the plaintiff was what Medi-Cal
had paid on his behalf, and to award him more was to place him in a better financial position than he was in before the tort was committed.96
Hanif, therefore, limited a tort plaintiff’s recovery to the amount paid or
incurred for past medical care and services whether it was paid by the
plaintiff or by an independent source.97
Hanif and the California courts’ earlier decisions, however, did not
discuss the central arguments before the court in Howell; namely, whether restricting recovery to amounts actually paid by a plaintiff or on his or
her behalf contravenes the collateral source rule.98 The Howell court reduced the arguments to four central disputed issues:
(1) Was Hanif correct that a tort plaintiff can recover only what has
been paid or incurred for medical care, even if that is less than the
reasonable value of the services rendered? (2) Even if Hanif, which
involved Medi-Cal payments, reached the right result on its facts,
does its logic extend to plaintiffs covered by private insurance? (3)
Does limiting the plaintiff’s recovery to the amounts paid and owed
on his or her behalf confer a windfall on the tortfeasor, defeating the
policy goals of the collateral source rule? (4) Is the difference between the providers’ full billings and the amounts they have agreed
to accept from a patient’s insurer as full payment—what the appellate court below called the “negotiated rate differential”—a benefit

91. Hanif v. Hous. Auth., 246 Cal. Rptr. 192 (Cal. Ct. App. 1988).
92. Id. at 194.
93. Id.
94. Id. at 197.
95. Id. at 195.
96. Id. at 194–95.
97. Id. at 195.
98. Howell v. Hamilton Meats & Provisions, Inc., 257 P.3d 1130 (Cal. 2011).
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the patient receives from his or her health insurance policy subject
to the collateral source rule?99

The Howell court agreed with Hanif that a plaintiff may recover as
economic damages no more than the reasonable value of the medical
services received and is not entitled to recover the reasonable value if her
actual loss was less.100 A plaintiff could not recover more than his actual
loss because under California law, a medical expense had to be incurred
to be recoverable.101 The Howell court relied in part on §§ 3281 and 3282
of the California Civil Code, which provide that a plaintiff cannot recover for a service that might have reasonably been charged if she negotiated
a discount.102 The court reasoned that the same rule applies when the
plaintiff’s health insurer has obtained a discount.103
The Howell court noted that the Restatement rule had the same effect.104 The Restatement specifies that the measure of recovery for the
costs of services that a third party renders is ordinarily the reasonable
value of those services; if a person paid less than the exchange rate, then
he can recover no more than the amount paid, except when the low rate
was intended as a gift.105 And while the expenses of medical care are not
specifically mentioned in § 911 of the Restatement, the court found that
they were logically included in the rule articulated.106 The Howell court
also found that § 924 of the Restatement—which provides that medical
and other expenses must be reasonable—did not alter the general rule
that the expense must be incurred.107
The Howell court found Hanif’s limitation of recovery for MediCal recipients applied to plaintiffs with private medical insurance.108 The
court rejected the plaintiff’s argument that she incurred liability for the
full amount of her medical providers’ bills when she signed their patient
agreements and accepted their services.109 Because of the preexisting
agreement between her health insurer and the medical providers, the
court reasoned it could not meaningfully be said that the plaintiff ever

99. Id. at 1137.
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. Id.; CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 3281, 3282 (1872).
103. See Howell, 257 P.3d at 1138.
104. Id.
105. Id.; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 911. cmt. h (1979).
106. Howell, 257 P.3d at 1138.
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. Id.
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incurred the full charges.110 As in Hanif, the plaintiff in Howell bore no
personal responsibility for the providers’ charges.111
One exception noted in Hanif is that a plaintiff could recover for
medical services gratuitously provided or discounted by his medical care
providers.112 This exception—that the collateral source rule applies to
gratuitous payments and services—is supported by the Restatement.113
The rationale for the exception is to encourage charitable action and preclude a tortfeasor from gaining the benefit of charity.114 The exception
raises the question that if the amount of gratuitous discount is considered
a collateral source payment, should the amount of a negotiated discount
be treated the same way?
The Howell court found that the exception for gratuitous discounts
did not apply to medical providers who agreed to accept discounted
payment because they did so “not as a gift to the patient or insurer, but
for commercial reasons as a result of negotiations.”115 The agreement
guarantees prompt payment along with other administrative and marketing advantages.116 Additionally, there is no danger the agreements will
disappear if plaintiffs are not allowed to recover the full amount billed
because medical providers have no financial reason to care if plaintiffs
recover the negotiated rate differential.117
The Howell court determined that a tortfeasor does not obtain a
“windfall” because the injured party’s health insurer negotiated a favorable rate of payment with the medical provider.118 The rationale behind
not allowing a tortfeasor to deduct from damages the benefits received
from a collateral source or gift is that a tortfeasor would not be paying
the full cost of her negligence or wrongdoing, which would distort the
deterrence function of tort law.119 The court found that this rationale did
not apply to a plaintiff only paying the discounted price negotiated by a
health insurer because of the complexities of pricing and reimbursement
patterns for medical providers.120
The Howell court relied, in part, on the observation that because so
many patients—insured, uninsured, and recipients under government
health care programs—pay discounted rates, hospital bills have been
110. Id. at 1138–39.
111. Id. at 1139.
112. Id.
113. Id.; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 920A. cmt. c(3) (1979).
114. Id. at 1140.
115. Howell, 257 P.3d at 1139–40.
116. Id. at 1140.
117. Id.
118. Id. at 1141.
119. Id.
120. Id.
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called “insincere, in the sense that they would yield truly enormous profits if those prices were actually paid.”121 The court noted that it is not
possible to say generally that medical providers’ full bills represent the
real value of their services, nor that the discounted payments they accept
from private insurers are mere arbitrary reductions.122 “Accordingly, a
tortfeasor who pays only the discounted amount of damages does not
generally receive a windfall and is not generally undeterred from engaging in risky conduct.”123
Finally, the Howell court determined that the negotiated rate differential was not a benefit accruing to the plaintiff under her policy for
which she paid premiums.124 The Howell court noted that health insurers
and medical providers negotiate rates in pursuit of their own business
interests and that the benefits of the bargains made accrue directly to
them, with the primary benefit going to the medical insurer.125 In addition, the negotiated rate differential did not necessarily reflect the commercial advantage the medical providers obtained in exchange for accepting a discounted payment in a particular case.126 In other words, the
global value of the negotiated rate to the medical provider cannot be
equated to the plaintiff’s individual case.
The Howell court ruled that where a medical care provider accepted
as full payment a sum less than the provider’s full bill, then it is evidence
of the amount paid that is relevant at trial to prove the plaintiff’s damages.127 Evidence that the medical bills were paid by an insurer would remain inadmissible under the collateral source rule.128 The effect of the
Howell court’s ruling is that evidence of the full-billed amount is not itself relevant on the issue of past medical expense where the provider has
by prior agreement accepted less than the billed amount.129 The Howell
court, however, expressed no opinion about the relevance or admissibility of the full-billed amount on other issues such as noneconomic damages of future medical expenses.130
In Corenbaum v. Lampkin, the California Court of Appeals picked
up where the Howell court left off and concluded that evidence of the full
amount billed for the plaintiff’s medical care was not relevant to the
121. Id. at 1142 (quoting Uwe E. Reinhardt, The Pricing of U.S. Hospital Services: Chaos
Behind the Veil of Secrecy, 25 HEALTH AFF. 57, 63 (2006)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. Id. at 1143.
125. Id. at 1143–44.
126. Id. at 1144.
127. Id.
128. See id. at 1143.
129. Id.
130. Id. at 1146.
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amount of damages for past medical services, damages for future medical care, or noneconomic damages.131 In Corenbaum, the plaintiffs suffered serious injuries in a motor vehicle accident while they were passengers in a taxicab.132 The plaintiffs brought separate actions against the
defendant, which were consolidated before trial.133 Prior to the May 2011
jury trial, the plaintiffs filed a motion in limine to exclude any evidence
of the payment of plaintiffs’ medical bills by a collateral source.134 The
defendant requested a post-verdict hearing in the event that the jury verdict included damages for past medical expenses in an amount exceeding
the amount paid for those medical services.135
In accordance with the trial court’s ruling on the motion in limine,
the jury heard evidence of the full amount billed for the plaintiffs’ medical care and heard no evidence of the lesser amounts accepted by their
medical providers as full payment pursuant to prior agreement with the
plaintiffs’ private insurers.136 The jury returned a verdict on June 3, 2011,
awarding the plaintiffs past and future economic damages and noneconomic damages.137 The defendant’s June 24, 2011 motion to reduce the
compensatory damage awards was continued to August 23, 2011, and
then to September 6, 2011.138 On July 5, 2011, the trial court entered
separate judgments against the defendant, and on August 17, 2011, the
trial court denied the defendant’s motions for a new trial and for a judgment notwithstanding the verdict on the issue of punitive damages.139
The next day, on August 18, 2011, the California court filed its
opinion in Howell.140 The Corenbaum trial court subsequently denied the
defendant’s motion to reduce the compensatory damage awards on September 6, 2011, finding it did not have jurisdiction to reduce the awards
because it had already denied the defendant’s motion for a new trial.141
The defendant appealed, contending the trial court erred by admitting
evidence of the full amount billed for plaintiffs’ medical care when the
amounts accepted by their medical providers as full payment were less
than the amounts billed.142

131. Corenbaum v. Lampkin, 156 Cal. Rptr. 3d 347 (Cal. Ct. App. 2013).
132. Id. at 353–54.
133. Id. at 354.
134. Id. at 355.
135. Id.
136. Id.
137. Id.
138. Id. at 356.
139. Id.
140. Id.
141. Id.
142. Id. at 357.
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After considering the reasoning in Howell, the Corenbaum court
held that evidence of the full amount billed for a plaintiff’s medical care
is not relevant to the determination of a plaintiff’s damages for past medical expenses and is therefore inadmissible for that purpose if the plaintiffs’ medical providers, by prior agreement, had contracted to accept a
lesser amount as full payment for the services provided.143
The Corenbaum court rejected the argument that a plaintiff seeking
damages for past medical expenses should be able to present evidence of
not only the amount accepted as full payment for past medical services
provided, but also the reasonable value of those services.144 The court
rejected this argument because a plaintiff can recover as damages no
more than the amount incurred for past medical services; therefore, evidence of the reasonable value of said services that exceed the amount
paid is irrelevant and inadmissible.145 The court also noted that the evidence would likely confuse the jury, suggest the existence of a collateral
source of payment, and lead to a showing that the lesser amount was negotiated and paid by the plaintiffs’ health insurers.146
The Corenbaum court then held that the full amount billed for past
medical services is not relevant to the amount of future medical expenses
and thus inadmissible for that purpose.147 The court relied upon the
statement in Howell that the full amount billed is not an accurate measure
of the value of medical services: “a medical provider’s billed price for
particular services is not necessarily representative of either the cost of
providing those services or their market value.”148 The court also determined that for a jury to consider evidence of the amount accepted as full
payment, for the purpose of determining the amount of past economic
damages, and the full amount billed, for some other purpose, would most
certainly cause jury confusion and suggest the existence of a collateral
source payment.149
The Corenbaum court further held that any expert who testified on
remand with respect to the reasonable value of future medical services
the plaintiffs are reasonably likely to require may not rely on the full
amounts billed for the plaintiffs’ past medical expenses.150 The court
concluded that evidence of the full amount billed cannot support an expert opinion or the reasonable value of future medical services because
143. Id. at 360.
144. Id. at 361.
145. Id. (citing Howell v. Hamilton Meats & Provisions, Inc., 257 P.3d 1130 (Cal. 2011)).
146. Id.
147. Id. at 363.
148. Id. at 362.
149. Id. at 363.
150. Id. at 364.
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the full amount billed for past medical services is not relevant to the value of those services and that expert opinion based on speculation or conjecture is inadmissible.151 In addition, expert testimony based on the full
amount billed would lead to the introduction of evidence concerning the
lower negotiated price, thus violating the evidentiary aspect of the collateral source rule.152
The Corenbaum court also held that evidence of the full amount
billed is not relevant to the amount of noneconomic damages.153 The
court noted that the determination of noneconomic damages was subjective and committed to the discretion of the trier of fact.154 The court observed that lawyers have used the amount of economic damages as a
point of reference in their arguments to juries as a means to help determine the amount of noneconomic damages.155 The court, however, found
the practice could provide no justification for the admission of evidence
that is otherwise irrelevant and inadmissible.156 Accordingly, the court
concluded evidence of the full amount billed is inadmissible for purposes
of proving noneconomic damages.157
The dissenting opinion in Howell proposed a third alternative: evidence of payment, including acceptance of a lesser amount, is barred by
the collateral source rule, and when a medical provider, by prior agreement, accepts less than the full billed amount as full payment, then evidence of the full billed amount is not relevant and inadmissible on the
issue of past medical expenses.158 Under this third alternative, a plaintiff
could recover the reasonable value or market value of medical services
as determined by expert testimony at trial.159
The dissent agreed that a plaintiff is not entitled to recover the gross
amount of potentially inflated medical bills, but it rejected a bright-line
rule limiting recovery to no more than the amount medical providers accepted in full payment for their services.160 The dissent believed such a
limitation left an insured plaintiff in a worse position than an uninsured
plaintiff.161 The dissent, however, did not consider the impact that a subrogation clause has on a plaintiff’s recovery. The dissent further believed
151. Id. at 363.
152. Id. at 363–64.
153. Id. at 364.
154. Id.
155. Id. at 364–65.
156. Id. at 365.
157. Id.
158. Howell v. Hamilton Meats & Provisions, Inc., 257 P.3d 1130, 1146 (Cal. 2011).
159. See id. This is the only time that the dissent says “market value,” implying reasonable
value and market value are the same.
160. Id. at 1146–47.
161. Id. at 1147.
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that an insured individual purchased “not only indemnity coverage but
also access to the negotiated discounts between her health insurer” and
medical providers.162 Therefore, an uninsured individual is entitled to
retain any difference between the reasonable value of her treatment and
the lesser amount the providers agreed to accept as payment in full.163
The dissent also failed to address a plaintiff’s recovery when she had no
choice but to pay more than the reasonable value of the medical services
received.
The dissent observed that the majority of states follow § 924 of the
Restatement Second of Torts, which permits plaintiffs to seek the reasonable value of their expenses without limitation to the amount that they
pay or that third parties pay on their behalf.164 The dissent believed that
permitting recovery for the reasonable value of medical services is the
fairest approach because to do otherwise would create separate categories of plaintiffs based on the method used to finance medical expenses.165 The dissent did not acknowledge that the method used to finance
medical expenses dictated the amount of those medical expenses.
The dissent believed both the original medical bill rendered and the
amount accepted as full payment should be admissible to prove the reasonable value of a plaintiff’s medical care.166 “The jury may decide that
the reasonable value of medical care is the amount originally billed, the
amount the medical provider accepted as payment, or some amount in
between.”167 The jury would weigh the evidence and determine the reasonable value of treatment with the help of expert opinion testimony.168
In McConnell v. Wal-Mart Stores Inc., a Nevada district court rejected the Howell court’s ruling that a medical provider accepting less
than the full amount billed pursuant to a preexisting contract is not the
forgiveness of a debt.169 The court predicted that the dissenting opinion
in Howell accurately reflected how the Nevada Supreme Court would
address the issue.170 Accordingly, the court ruled:
[The] defendant may attempt to prove at trial that the amounts billed
by Plaintiff’s medical providers were unreasonable in-and-of themselves—assuming Defendant has experts to provide such testimo162. Id.
163. Id.
164. Id. at 1151.
165. Id. (citing Martiney v. Milburn Enterprises, Inc., 233 P.3d 205 (Kan. 2009)).
166. Id. at 1153 (citing Robinson v. Bates, 857 N.E.2d 1195, 1200 (Ohio 2006)).
167. Id. (citing Robinson, 857 N.E.2d at 1200).
168. Id.
169. McConnell v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., No. 2:12-CV-01601-RCJ, 2014 WL 464799, at *4
(D. Nev. Feb. 5, 2014).
170. Id.
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ny—but Defendant may not under the collateral source rule argue
that any amount written down is necessarily unreasonable by the
very fact that the amount was written down.171

The court apparently departed from the dissent in Howell on the admissibility of the amount accepted as full payment. The court also did not rule
on what facts the defendant’s expert witness could use to support his
opinion. Finally, the court buttressed its ruling by stating it encouraged
the purchase of insurance,172 although the primary beneficiaries under its
ruling arguably are people on Medicaid.
In Luttrell v. Island Pacific Supermarkets, Inc., a California appellate court held that “Howell governs where past medical expenses have
been paid by Medicare, and the Howell cap should be imposed before
any reduction for failure to mitigate damages.”173 And in Sanchez v.
Brooke, a separate California appellate court held that an injured employee’s recovery is limited to amounts paid to medical providers by
one’s employer under workers’ compensation law.174
California’s recent leading decision on write-offs provides a jurisprudential framework for a Washington could revisit its application of
the collateral source rule. Whether Washington should amend its application per Howell’s majority opinion or dissent will be further discussed.
But first, reviewing the current political and economic environment surrounding tort reform and the collateral source rule is pivotal.
IV. FROM MICHIGAN TO PENNSYLVANIA: TORT REFORM, MEDICAL
BILLING, AND THE DIFFERENCES IN STATE SUPREME COURT RULINGS
When considering whether Washington should revisit Hayes v.
Wieber Enterprises, Inc. and amend its application of the collateral
source rule, it is imperative to assess the current health care environment
and reflect on how other state courts are ruling on write-offs per the collateral source rule. This Part summarizes the overwhelming rise in cost
of the original amount billed for medical services and how “reasonableness” or “unreasonableness” is determined. This Part also explores the
tort reform movement and how other states are modifying or maintaining
their rulings on write-offs. Lastly, this Part examines contractual agreements and, specifically, subrogation clauses.

171. Id. at *5.
172. Id. at *6.
173. Luttrell v. Island Pac. Supermarkets, Inc., 155 Cal. Rptr. 3d 273, 274 (Cal. Ct. App.
2013).
174. Sanchez v. Brooke, 138 Cal. Rptr. 3d 507 (Cal. Ct. App. 2012).
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A. Outrageous Medical Bills in the United States and
Determining Their “Reasonableness”
In 1960, “there were no discounts, everyone paid the same rates”
for medical care, which was usually the actual cost of the medical care
plus 10%.175 The rise of managed care organizations, which typically
restrict payments for services to their members, has led to increases in
the prices charged to uninsured patients, who do not benefit from providers’ contracts with the plans.176 As some insurers demanded deep discounting, hospitals vigorously “shifted costs to patients with less
clout.”177 “Some physicians, too, have reportedly shifted costs to the uninsured, resulting in significant disparities between charges to uninsured
patients and those with private insurance or public medical benefits.”178
As a consequence of shifting costs, “[o]nly uninsured, self-paying
U.S. patients have been billed the full charges listed in hospitals’ inflated
chargemasters.”179 A chargemaster is an internal price list that every hospital uses, although no hospital’s chargemaster prices are consistent with
those of any other hospital.180 Insurers negotiate prices by a percentage
above the Medicare rates or below the chargemaster price.181 Stamford
Hospital spokesman Scott Orstad commented, “[V]ery few people actually pay [chargemaster] rates.”182 However, due to the collateral source
rule applying to write-offs, defendants are required to pay this original
invoiced amount for the medical services provided before the insured
discounted price.
For example, a California family might find itself “paying off over
many years a hospital bill of, say, $30,000 for a procedure that Medicaid
would have reimbursed at only $6,000 and commercial insurers some175. Mark A. Hall & Carl E. Schneider, Patients As Consumers: Courts, Contracts, and the
New Medical Marketplace, 106 MICH. L. REV. 643, 663 (2008); see also A Review of Hospital Billing and Collection Practices, Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Oversight and Investigations of the
H. Comm. on Energy and Com., 108th Cong. 18 (2004) (testimony of Gerard F. Anderson, Director,
Johns Hopkins Center for Health Finance and Management) [hereinafter Anderson Testimony 2004],
available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG-108hhrg95446/pdf/CHRG-108hhrg95446.pdf;
Paul B. Ginsburg, Shopping for Price in Medical Care, 26 HEALTH AFF. 208 (2009), available at
http://content.healthaffairs.org/content/26/2/w208.full. Important exceptions include specialists who
provide discrete or limited services, such as a diagnostic service done at a separate facility (e.g.,
MRIs) or a fairly simple surgery for a condition handled in a standardized way (e.g., a vasectomy or
an uncomplicated childbirth).
176. Howell v. Hamilton Meats & Provisions, Inc., 257 P.3d 1130, 1141 (Cal. 2011).
177. Hall & Schneider, supra note 179, at 662.
178. Howell, 257 P.3d at 1141–42.
179. Id. at 1141.
180. Steven Brill, Bitter Pill: How Outrageous Pricing and Egregious Profits Are Destroying
Our Health Care, TIME MAG., Mar. 2013, at 1, 22.
181. Id. at 23.
182. Id.
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where in between.”183 As explained in Howell’s majority opinion, “because so many patients, insured, uninsured, and recipients under government health care programs, pay discounted rates, hospital bills have
been called ‘insincere, in the sense that they would yield truly enormous
profits if those prices were actually paid.’”184
According to the Kaiser Family Foundation, the portion of the
economy devoted to health care has risen steadily for at least fifty years,
rising from 5.2% of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) in 1960 to 17.9% of
GDP in 2010.185 In only the last ten years, U.S. spending on health care
doubled, from $1.3 trillion to $2.6 trillion a year, which is suspected to
reach $4.6 trillion in 2020.186 In addition, the Center for Medicare &
Medicaid Services (CMS) estimates that nearly one-fifth (19.8%) of
GDP will be devoted to health care by the year 2020.187 This amounts to
per capita spending on health care that exceeds $13,000 a year.188 This is
thousands more spent than any other developed or industrialized country.189
Health care costs associated with medical services are slated to rise
drastically during the next ten years,190 which will have serious implications for write-offs because as health care costs rise chargemaster prices
will undoubtedly become even more inflated. The question is whether
Washington should continue accepting the original amount billed as
“reasonable” when it is inflated and rarely paid.
1. Assessing “Reasonableness”
The amount accepted by the medical provider as payment in full is
by definition the market value of the services provided. This is the
amount negotiated by a willing buyer to a willing seller, i.e., the
amount a private health insurance company or government agency
agreed to pay a medical provider for a particular service. These types of
agreements were unknown in 1914 when the court in Torgeson v. Han183. Howell, 257 P.3d at 1141.
184. Id. (quoting Uwe E. Reinhardt, The Pricing of U.S. Hospital Services: Chaos Behind the
Veil of Secrecy, 25 HEALTH AFF. 57, 63 (2006)).
185. HENRY J. KAISER FAM. FOUND., HEALTH CARE COSTS: A PRIMER 4 (2012) [hereinafter
KAISER FOUND. REPORT], available at http://kaiserfamilyfoundation.files.wordpress.com/2013/01/
7670-03.pdf.
186. Arthur Kellermann, Time to Focus on Healthcare Costs, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP. (June
29, 2012), http://www.usnews.com/opinion/articles/2012/06/29/time-to-focus-on-healthcare-costs.
187. KAISER FOUND. REPORT, supra note 189, at 4.
188. See Kellermann, supra note 190.
189. KAISER FOUND. REPORT, supra note 189, at 7.
190. Infographic: Why America Must Address the Rising Costs of Healthcare, HEALTHCARE
FIN. NEWS (Aug. 21, 2012), http://www.healthcarefinancenews.com/infographic/infographic-whyamerica-must-address-rising-costs-healthcare.
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ford held a plaintiff had to establish he paid the reasonable value of medical services. People no longer travel by horse and buggy, and the
amount paid for medical services is no longer determined by an agreement between patient and provider. Instead, as noted above, a hospital’s
chargemaster determines the invoiced price of all medical services.191
Chargemaster prices are not based on anything objective, and as noted by
Brill, “[w]ere set in cement a long time ago and just keep going up almost automatically.”192
The invoiced price is simply the beginning figure in a transaction
process, and it can be argued that the amount accepted as payment in full
represents the reasonable value of those services. A defendant seeking to
limit recovery to the amount accepted as payment in full would not be
arguing that a plaintiff may not recover for medical bills paid by a collateral source. Rather, the defendant would be arguing that a plaintiff may
only recover the full amount of her medical costs—not the amount billed.
For example, three CT scans at Yale New Haven Health System cost an
insured patient $6,538, but Medicare would have only paid $825 for all
three.193 “By law, Medicare’s payments approximate a hospital’s cost of
providing a service, including overhead, equipment, and salaries.”194 In
this instance, Medicare’s payment could be seen as the “reasonable” cost
of the service—not the amount initially billed.
The above argument is similar to a case recently decided in Pennsylvania. In Moorhead v. Crozer Chester Medical Center, the appellant’s
decedent fell and injured herself, requiring medical services provided by
the appellee.195 The appellant was covered under Medicare as well as a
“Blue Cross 65” supplemental plan, for which she paid premiums.196 The
“fair and reasonable value” of the medical services rendered to the appellant was $108,668, but Medicare’s allowance for those services was
$12,167.197 The issue on appeal was whether the appellant was entitled to
collect the additional amount of $96,501 as an expense even though the
appellant did not pay the $96,501, nor did Medicare or Blue Cross 65
pay that amount on her behalf.198 The court affirmed that Pennsylvania
case law allows a plaintiff to recover the reasonable value of medical
services.199 However, the court held that the collateral source rule did not
191. See Brill, supra note 184, at 22.
192. Id.
193. Id. at 28.
194. Id. at 18.
195. Moorhead v. Crozer Chester Med. Ctr., 765 A.2d 786 (Pa. 2001).
196. Id. at 788.
197. Id.
198. Id.
199. Id. at 789.
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apply to the illusory charge of $96,501 because that amount was not paid
by any collateral source.200
Another example is from the Indiana Supreme Court where in Butler v. Indiana Department of Insurance, the plaintiff filed a claim for
medical negligence against Clarian Health Partners, Inc. and several individual health care providers.201 The plaintiff died before the claim was
resolved, but her estate continued with the claim and later settled with
Clarian.202 The plaintiff’s estate also proceeded with its claim against the
other insurer, the Indiana Patient Compensation Fund (Fund).203 The
Fund sought partial summary judgment, claiming the plaintiff’s estate
was entitled to recovery, but only for the expenses the plaintiff actually
incurred for medical services and not the total amount of medical bills
received.204
The Fund relied on its interpretation of Indiana Code § 34-23-1-1,
which governs actions for the wrongful death of unmarried adult persons
without dependents. The court held:
With respect to damages pursuant to Indiana Code § 34-23-12(c)(3)(A), when medical providers provide statements of charges
for health care services to the decedent but thereafter accept a reduced amount adjusted due to contractual arrangements with the insurers or government benefit providers, in full satisfaction the
charges, the amount recoverable under the statute for the
‘[r]easonable medical . . . expenses necessitated’ by the wrongful
act is the portion of the billed charges ultimately accepted pursuant
to such contractual adjustments.205

And in Kastick v. U-Haul Co. of Western Michigan, the plaintiff
was making a left turn from State Route 38 into his daughter’s driveway
in the city of Auburn when a U-Haul truck leased by the defendant struck
his vehicle on the driver’s side.206 The plaintiff was unable to take in
enough oxygen due to his injuries and became dependent on a respirator.207 The plaintiff died only five months after the accident.208 The New
York Supreme Court, Appellate Division, stated the following:
Defendants contend that plaintiff may not recover from them an
amount for which she never became obligated. We agree with de200. Id. at 791.
201. Butler v. Ind. Dep’t of Ins., 904 N.E.2d 198, 199 (Ind. 2009).
202. Id.
203. Id.
204. Id.
205. Id. at 202.
206. Kastick v. U-Haul Co. of W. Mich., 292 A.D.2d 797 (N.Y. App. Div. 2002).
207. Id.
208. Id.

1394

Seattle University Law Review

[Vol. 37:1371

fendants. Although the write-off technically is not a payment from a
collateral source . . . it is not an item of damages for which plaintiff
may recover because plaintiff has incurred no liability.209

Not all state courts use similar reasoning; for example, the Wisconsin Supreme Court did not permit the amount paid to be accepted as the
recovery under the reasonable expense doctrine—even though the plaintiff, like in Kastick, incurred no liability for the full amount billed. In
Leitinger v. DBart, Inc., the plaintiff was injured at a construction site
and brought a personal injury action against the property owner, subcontractor, health insurer, and liability insurers.210 The plaintiff’s health care
provider billed the plaintiff $154,819 for the treatment of her injuries
caused by the defendant’s negligent actions, but as a result of the negotiated discounts, the health care provider accepted $111,395 from the
plaintiff’s insurance company.211 This amounted to a difference of
$43,424.212 Since the jury awards the “reasonable value” of the plaintiff’s
medical treatment, the defendant argued that the collateral source rule
should not apply because the jury should know the amount the plaintiff’s
health insurance company actually paid for the medical treatment, not the
amount billed, as that would aid in their computation of what the reasonable value of the medical treatment was.213
The court held that “the collateral source rule prohibits parties in a
personal injury action from introducing evidence of the amount actually
paid by . . . a collateral source for medical treatment rendered to prove
the reasonable value of the medical treatment.”214 To reach its conclusion, the court reasoned that it “might bring complex, confusing side issues before the fact-finder that are not necessarily related to the value of
the medical services rendered.”215 In addition, the court explained that
one issue of confusion would be the reimbursement rate because it was
decided based on the contractual agreement between the plaintiff and his
insurance carrier, and is not solely based on the reasonable value of medical services.216 The cost of the plaintiff’s medical treatment, therefore,
would vary depending on different contractual agreements.
The court’s ruling in Leitinger is similar to the South Carolina Supreme Court decision in Covington v. George. In Covington, the defend-

209. Id. at 798.
210. Leitinger v. DBart, Inc., 736 N.W.2d 1 (Wis. 2007).
211. Id.
212. Id.
213. Id. at 3–4.
214. Id. at 4.
215. Id.
216. Id. at 18.
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ant rear-ended the plaintiff when the plaintiff stopped for a school bus.217
The defendant admitted his liability for the accident but contested the
amount of damages.218 The plaintiff was billed $1,430 for services performed after the accident, but the health care provider accepted $277 as
full payment for the services.219 The plaintiff was then billed $1,969 for
additional services and the health care provider again accepted the lower
rate of $371 with $58 still owed.220 The defendant sought to introduce
evidence of the actual payment accepted by the health care provider in
order to challenge the “reasonableness of the medical expenses sought by
the plaintiff.”221
According to the court, a tortfeasor cannot “take advantage of a
contract between an injured party and a third person, no matter whether
the source of the funds received is ‘an insurance company, an employer,
a family member, or other source.’”222 The court held that while the defendant was permitted to attack the “necessity and reasonableness” of the
medical care and costs, the defendant could not do so by utilizing evidence of payments made by a collateral source.223
Some states, moreover, are aware of the windfall of benefits associated with the adherence to the collateral source rule and still permit the
plaintiff’s double recovery. For example, the Virginia Supreme Court
recently reaffirmed the collateral source rule in Acuar v. Letourneau by
stating,
A plaintiff who receives a double recovery for a single tort enjoys a
windfall; a defendant who escapes, in whole or in part, liability for
his wrong enjoys a windfall. Because the law must sanction one
windfall and deny the other, it favors the victim of the wrong rather
than the wrongdoer.224

As previously discussed, states differ on their application of the collateral source rule, with one extreme being New Hampshire. New Hampshire has eliminated the collateral source rule—including to allow the
introduction of evidence of government benefits such as Medicare, Medicaid, or Social Security.225 This frustration is exemplified in the court’s
opinion in Gordon v. Forsyth County Hospital Authority, Inc., where the
217. Covington v. George, 597 S.E.2d 142, 143 (S.C. 2004).
218. Id.
219. Id.
220. Id.
221. Id. at 144.
222. Id. (internal citation omitted).
223. Id. at 145.
224. Acuar v. Letourneau, 531 S.E.2d 316, 323 (Va. 2000).
225. Melissa Young, Tort Reform and the Collateral Source Rule, AM. ACAD. OF
ORTHOPAEDIC SURGEONS (Mar. 2009), http://www.aaos.org/news/aaosnow/mar09/managing4.asp.
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judge noted, “it would be unconscionable to permit the taxpayers to bear
the expense of providing free medical care to a person and then allow
that person to recover damages for medical services from a tort-feasor
and pocket the windfall.”226
When confronted with the issue of ruling on the reasonableness of
write-offs, state courts have either maintained their coverage under the
collateral source rule or held the defendant should only be responsible
for the actual amount paid. In connection with the rising cost of the original amount billed for medical services, the current tort reform environment encourages modification of the collateral source rule.
Washington should abolish its requirement that a plaintiff
must establish that the amount paid for past medical expenses was reasonable when the plaintiff or a third party has paid the market value of
the services provided. While the requirement might have made sense
when it was adopted in Torgeson v. Hanford in 1914, its continued use is
unwarranted because medical bills are no longer agreements between plaintiffs and providers. The requirement is also impractical. The
reasonableness of medical expenses can be established by the testimony
of the medical provider. This is how the plaintiff in Hayes established the
reasonableness of the full amount billed for the services provided to her.
Has a medical provider in Washington ever testified that the amount she
billed was not reasonable?
B. How Does Tort Reform Impact the Write-Offs and the Collateral
Source Rule?
The tort reform movement has actively targeted the collateral
source rule and focused on preventing the overcompensation of plaintiffs. In a 2006 survey of state statutes exploring the collateral source
rule, Professors David Schap and Andrew Feeley discovered the following:
[Thirty-eight] states modified the rule in some form to allow the introduction of collateral source evidence in medical liability cases.
Twenty states permitted consideration of collateral source offsets
during trial, while [fourteen] states required consideration of such
offsets after the judgment or award. Six states required the offset to
be taken after the jury’s verdict but before entry of judgment by the
court.227

The American Tort Reform Association (ATRA) “supports permitting the admissibility of evidence of collateral source payments at trial or
226. Gordon v. Forsyth Cnty. Hosp. Auth., Inc., 409 F. Supp. 708, 719 (M.D.N.C. 1975).
227. See Young, supra note 229.
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requiring awards to be offset by the amount paid to plaintiffs by collateral sources, less the amount paid by the plaintiff to secure the benefit.”228 The ATRA supports eliminating the collateral source rule specifically because it prevents relevant information used to determine damages
from reaching the jury, and it allows the plaintiffs to be compensated
twice for the same injury.229
In addition, the American Academy of Orthopaedic Surgeons
(AAOS) issued a position statement supporting the enactment of federal
tort reform legislation, including, but not limited to, a specific cap on
noneconomic damages and mandatory offset of collateral sources of
payment.230 The AAOS argued that allowing plaintiffs to recover the undiscounted price for medical services when there is ample evidence to
show that they paid less will have the net effect of increasing societal
costs through higher insurance premiums.231
Would tort reform laws, such as one modifying the collateral source
rule, have a substantial impact on lowering health care costs in Washington? Because Washington is one of the few states that modified its collateral source rule in medical liability cases, modifying the collateral
source rule would most likely not have an impact on health care costs.
The Revised Code of Washington (RCW) § 7.70.080 supersedes the
common law collateral source rule in regards to health care lawsuits. Under this statute,
Any party may present evidence to the trier of fact that the plaintiff
has already been compensated for the injury complained of from
any source except the assets of the plaintiff, the plaintiff’s representative, or the plaintiff’s immediate family. In the event such evidence is admitted, the plaintiff may present evidence of an obligation to repay such compensation and evidence of any amount paid
by the plaintiff, or his or her representative or immediate family, to
secure the right to the compensation. Compensation as used in this
section shall mean payment of money or other property to or on behalf of the plaintiff, rendering of services to the plaintiff free of
charge to the plaintiff, or indemnification of expenses incurred by or
on behalf of the plaintiff. Notwithstanding this section, evidence of
compensation by a defendant health care provider may be offered
only by that provider.232
228. Collateral Source Rule Reform, AM. TORT REFORM ASS’N, http://www.atra.org/issues/
collateral-source-rule-reform (last visited Apr. 6, 2014).
229. Id.
230. Position Statement: Medical Liability Reform, AM. ACAD. OF ORTHOPAEDIC SURGEONS,
http://www.aaos.org/about/papers/position/1118.asp (last visited Apr. 6, 2014).
231. See id.
232. WASH. REV. CODE § 7.70.080 (2006).
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The statute clearly establishes that in medical malpractice actions, either
party can introduce evidence that a plaintiff has already been compensated from a third party, such as an insurance payout.233
Dr. Glenn D. Braunstein, chairman of the Department of Medicine
at Cedars-Sinai, specifically addressed whether medical malpractice and
tort reform would have an effect on total health care costs. Dr.
Braunstein contends that the “direct costs in 2009 to providers of medical
malpractice liability insurance, costs including insurance premiums, settlements, awards and administrative costs, totaled $35 billion, according
to the Congressional Budget Office.”234 Therefore, even “if those costs
were reduced by 10 percent, it would only reduce the national health expenditures by 0.2 percent. Even if reforms resulted in less use of health
care services driven by fear of lawsuits, savings to the system would be
about 0.5 percent or $11 billion in 2009.”235 This malpractice reform
proposal would not limit awards for victims, but it would allow doctors
to use a “safe harbor defense.”236 Under a safe harbor defense, a defendant doctor or hospital can argue that the care it provided was within “the
bounds of what peers have established as reasonable under the circumstances.”237
Dr. Braunstein, however, notes that tort reform could save the federal government’s Medicare, Medicaid, and other federal health insurance programs $54 billion over ten years, or $5.4 billion annually.238 Obviously, tort reform would have an effect on health care costs, but when
it currently costs $2.6 trillion239 per year, the claim that tort reform would
substantially reduce the government’s cost is arguably unsubstantiated.
C. Contractual Agreements and Subrogation Clauses: The Argument
Many states distinguish between collateral source payments made
by a private third party, such as personal health insurance, and those
made by a public source, such as Medicaid, Medicare, or Social Security.
This is because a plaintiff with private insurance has a prior contractual
agreement with the insurance company, i.e., the plaintiff may have bargained for a specific rate and has paid into the insurance. This is different
from public sources of insurance because public sources are not paid by a
233. See id.
234. Glenn D. Braunstein, Medical Malpractice and Tort Reform, HUFFINGTON POST (Aug.
13, 2012, 11:17 AM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/glenn-d-braunstein-md/medical-malpractice_
b_1761443.html.
235. Id.
236. See Brill, supra note 184, at 24.
237. Braunstein, supra note 238.
238. Id.
239. Id.
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plaintiff or bargained for between a plaintiff and the plaintiff’s employer;
instead, they are based on federal eligibility guidelines.240 Thus, these
“write-offs” between the plaintiff’s damages and the amount paid
through a public source are “phantom” benefits awarded to the plaintiff.241
This application of the collateral source rule is made in Tucker v.
Volunteers of America Colorado Branch. In Tucker, the plaintiff-invitee
brought a premises liability action against the defendant landowner, Volunteers of America Colorado Branch.242 The district court reduced the
plaintiff’s award by the difference between the full amount of his medical bills and the amount paid by his medical insurer.243 The Colorado
Court of Appeals concluded that the contract between the plaintiff’s insurer and plaintiff’s health care providers, which decreased the amount
actually paid for his medical care, inured to his benefit and fell within the
contractual exception to Colorado’s collateral source rule, codified in the
Colorado Revised Statute § 13-21-111.6.244 The Colorado Supreme Court
affirmed when it stated the following statutory interpretation:
In any action by any person or his legal representative to recover
damages for a tort resulting in death or injury to person or property,
the court, after the finder of fact has returned its verdict stating the
amount of damages to be awarded, shall reduce the amount of the
verdict by the amount by which such person, his estate, or his personal representative has been or will be wholly or partially indemnified or compensated for his loss by any other person, corporation,
insurance company, or fund in relation to the injury, damage, or
death sustained; except that the verdict shall not be reduced by the
amount by which such person, his estate, or his personal representative has been or will be wholly or partially indemnified or compensated by a benefit paid as a result of a contract entered into and paid
for by or on behalf of such person. The court shall enter judgment
on such reduced amount.245

The court clarified that this statute requires trial courts to set off any
payment received by a tort plaintiff, his estate, or personal representative
that was intended to indemnify or compensate such plaintiffs; however, it
exempts this setoff if the payment was made “as a result of a contract
entered into and paid for by or on behalf of such person.”246 Thus, the
240. See Young, supra note 229.
241. See id.
242. Tucker v. Volunteers of Am. Colo. Branch, 211 P.3d 708, 709 (Colo. App. 2008).
243. Id.
244. Id.
245. COL. REV. STAT. § 13-21-111.6 (1986).
246. Tucker, 211 P.3d at 712.
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court concluded that the contract between plaintiff’s insurer and the
health care providers, which decreased the amount actually paid for
plaintiff’s medical care, resulted in plaintiff’s benefit and falls within the
contract exception outlined in the statute.247
And in Windsor School District v. State, the plaintiff school district
sued the state of Vermont and the Vermont Department of Corrections
for expenses related to an environmental cleanup of school district property formerly owned by the state.248 On appeal, the Department of Corrections argued that the trial court erroneously invoked the collateral
source rule when it declined to reduce the plaintiff’s damages by the
amount it had been paid by its insurance company, which was acknowledged to be in excess of $470,000.249 The main basis of this argument
was that because the Department of Corrections gave grants to the plaintiff under applicable state aid, “the insurance policies from which [the
plaintiff] received payments were not a source ‘wholly independent from
the defendants.’”250
The court disagreed with the Department of Corrections because
even though it may have subsidized the operating expenses of the school
district, it could not definitively state that the insurance was purchased
because of the subsidization.251 The court agreed with the trial court that
the plaintiff’s insurance proceeds were a collateral source and, under the
collateral source rule, the state’s liability could not be reduced by the
amount the plaintiff received from its insurance company.252
However, in Papke v. Harbert, where the plaintiff filed a medical
malpractice suit as a result of both her legs being amputated,253 the South
Dakota Supreme Court prohibited evidence of the amount paid by public
sources as payment in full for the plaintiff’s medical care. The plaintiff
was billed $429,531 for her medical care; Medicare paid $79,412 and
Medicaid paid $133,874.254 “The remaining $216,874.03 was written off
and will never be paid by anyone.”255 The defendants argued that the
plaintiff’s right to recover the “reasonable value” of medical services as a
measure of damages does not include amounts “written off” by the medical care provider because of a contractual agreement between the provid-

247. Id.
248. Windsor Sch. Dist. v. State, 956 A.2d 528, 532 (Vt. 2008).
249. Id. at 542.
250. Id. at 544 (internal citation omitted).
251. Id.
252. Id.
253. Papke v. Harbert, 738 N.W.2d 510, 512 (S.D. 2007).
254. Id. at 530.
255. Id.
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er, Medicare, and Medicaid.256 The court nevertheless held that when
establishing the reasonable value of medical services, defendants in
South Dakota are prohibited from introducing evidence that a plaintiff’s
award should be reduced because of a benefit received wholly independent of the defendant.257 The court readily admitted that this might result
in a “windfall to the injured plaintiff,” but that it is better than letting a
“windfall go to an injured party [rather] than to a tortfeasor.”258
Subrogation Clauses
Black’s Law Dictionary defines subrogation as “the principle under
which an insurer that has paid a loss under an insurance policy is entitled
to all the rights and remedies belonging to the insured against a third party with respect to any loss covered by the policy.”259 Subrogation gives
an insurer the opportunity to recover the value of the benefits once paid
to the plaintiff.260 Upon payment for a loss, an insurer’s right to subrogate arises, assuming that the right has not been waived by contract or
conduct, or extinguished by applicable state or federal laws.261 Under the
“make whole doctrine,” an insurer generally cannot seek subrogation
until the insured has been fully compensated for any compensable injuries she sustained.262
At one time, the collateral source rule may have commonly resulted
in defendants receiving compensation from both their health insurer and
a tortfeasor whenever the defendant had health insurance at the time of
an injury. Today, however, private health insurance companies and government agencies seek reimbursement for the medical bills that have
been paid through contractual subrogation or by statute.263 It has been
only in the last 30 to 40 years that subrogation disputes regarding personal injury cases have arisen. “During this period, subrogation clauses
have been inserted in first party medical payments coverage in automobile policies, uninsured and underinsured motorist coverage, and medical
and hospitalization coverages.”264

256. Id.
257. Id. at 536.
258. Id.
259. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1563–64 (9th ed. 2009).
260. Jamie L. Wershbale, Tort Reform in America: Abrogating the Collateral Source Rule
Across the States, 75 DEF. COUNSEL J. 346, 349 (2008).
261. Id.
262. Id.
263. Mahler v. Szucs, 957 P.2d 632, 641 (Wash. 1998).
264 Id. at 641 (citing Roger M. Baron, Subrogation on Medical Expense Claims: The “Double
Recovery” Myth and the Feasibility of Anti-Subrogation Laws, 96 DICK. L. REV. 581, 583 (1992)).
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In addition, Congress amended the Social Security Act in 1980 to
add the Medicare Secondary Payer Act, which effectively created Medicare “liens.” Congress amended the Social Security Act again in 2003 to
clarify its position that self-insured entities were included in the Medicare Secondary Payer Act. So after the 2003 amendment, it became clear
that all third-party recoveries were subject to reimbursement on the Medicare Secondary Payer Act.265
V. CONCLUSION
The common law in Washington now permits recovery for medical
expenses that were never incurred and have no relationship to their market value. Washington, therefore, should amend the common law application of the collateral source rule to disallow the recovery of write-offs.
The common law in Washington was adopted when medical providers
billed patients the same amount regardless of whether they were uninsured, had private insurance, or were covered by a government program,
and when subrogation clauses were virtually unknown.
Washington courts should adopt the California court’s ruling in
Howell that an injured plaintiff whose medical expenses are paid by a
private insurance plan can recover damages for past medical expenses in
an amount no greater than the amount that the plaintiff’s medical providers, pursuant to prior agreement, accepted as full payment or, to the extent that payment is still owed, the amount that the medical providers
have agreed to accept as full payment for the services provided.266 In
short, the plaintiff may only recover the market value of the services
provided.
Disallowing the recovery of write-offs does not violate Washington’s collateral source rule, and it still permits a plaintiff to recover the
reasonable value of necessary medical services caused by a defendant.
The collateral source rule is not violated because evidence of payment
remains inadmissible. The plaintiff is permitted to recover the reasonable
value of the medical services provided because recovery is permitted for
the market value of those services. After all, market value is the amount
paid by a willing buyer to a willing seller.
Write-offs would be eliminated if private health insurers and government agencies simply required medical care providers to bill only the
amount the health insurer contracted to pay or the amount allowed by
statute. Medical bills are elaborately coded, so it would be convenient for
medical providers to only bill health insurers and government agencies
265. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1395–1395b-10 (2012); 42 C.F.R. §§ 411.1–411.15 (2014).
266. Howell v. Hamilton Meats & Provisions, Inc., 257 P.3d 1130, 1145 (Cal. 2011).
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for the amount that they are contracted to pay or will pay by statute. This
requirement would result in the full amount billed also being the amount
paid on the plaintiff’s behalf. Adopting California’s ruling in Howell would preclude recovery for damages essentially caused by a billing
procedure.
Adopting the California court’s ruling in Howell would also ensure
all plaintiffs full recovery for their injuries, preclude using injuries as
economic opportunities, and reduce the cost of litigation. Allowing plaintiffs to recover the amount actually paid for medical services permits
plaintiffs to recover the market value of the medical services received
while avoiding the risk that a trier of fact might determine the reasonable
value of the medical services was less than the amount paid because others are billed less for the services provided to the plaintiffs.
It is repugnant for certain plaintiffs to receive a greater recovery for
the same injuries as other plaintiffs simply because they are on Medicaid
and not covered by private insurance. Limiting recovery to the actual
amount paid will undoubtedly have an impact on a jury’s determination
of noneconomic damages, but plaintiffs should not be allowed to recover
noneconomic damages based on an economic loss that they never incurred.
Finally, allowing recovery for the amount actually paid avoids the
cost of expert witnesses to battle the reasonable value of the medical services received by plaintiffs, as suggested by the dissent in Howell—
particularly when the market value can be readily obtained by ascertaining the amount actually paid for the medical services. In short, the trial
court in Patterson v. Horton got it right.
Washington’s adherence to laws that were handed down a century
ago, mixed with modern medical billing practices that include rarely paid
inflated invoices, has resulted in the recovery of medical expenses that
were never incurred and have no relationship to their market value.
Washington, therefore, should amend its common law application of the
collateral source rule to disallow the recovery of write-offs. By amending
its application, Washington would ensure that plaintiffs only recover the
market value of medical services in a cost effective manner.

